A few days before his assassination on May 21, 1990, Mirwaiz Moulvi Mohammad Farooq, a prominent cleric in Srinagar, reached out to public intellectual and long-time friend Balraj Puri. Fearing for his life, Farooq requested Puri to use his influence to persuade the authorities to arrest him. His concerns arose from the prevailing atmosphere of fear in the Kashmir Valley, where militants had carried out multiple targeted assassinations. The region was experiencing an administrative and security breakdown.
The political role of the Mirwaiz in Kashmir had been evolving since the second quarter of the 20th century. The institution of Mirwaiz is unique to Kashmiri Islam. The Mirwaiz had openly criticised certain militant actions, including the abduction of Rubiya Sayeed, the daughter of the then Union Home Minister Mufti Mohammad Sayeed, on December 8, 1989. He condemned the kidnapping as unIslamic.
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Given this background, it was not surprising that Mirwaiz Farooq became a target for militants. Puri was informed by Governor Jagmohan Malhotra that Farooq could request security, which would be granted immediately. However, Puri reminded the former that the unique standing with the Kashmiri population that the Mirwaiz possessed would be damaged if he was seen to asking for security from the state apparatus. He instead suggested that the best way to protect both Mirwaiz’s life and his political influence was to have him arrested.
It is widely believed that Mirwaiz’s phone conversations with George Fernandes, who oversaw Kashmir affairs in the National Front coalition government, were recorded by sympathisers of militants. This led to speculation that Farooq was secretly advocating for dialogue with the Central government. A few days later, a group of armed men arrived at Mirwaiz Manzil, Farooq’s residence near the scenic Nagin Lake, under the pretext of meeting him. One of his employees escorted him to the meeting room, and as Farooq entered, a hail of bullets struck him down, killing him instantly. Subsequent police investigations revealed that the attack was carried out by Hizbul Mujahideen militants, a group that had been formed just a month earlier, in 1990.
Recent developments
The political nuances around the institution of the Mirwaiz in the turbulent history of J&K become important in the context of some recent developments. Nearly 35 years after the assassination of Mirwaiz Farooq, the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) has declared the Jammu and Kashmir Awami Action Committee (AAC), led by Mirwaiz Umar Farooq (son of Mirwaiz Mohammad Farooq), and the Jammu and Kashmir Ittihadul Muslimeen (JKIM), founded by the late Mohammad Abbas Ansari, as “unlawful associations” for the next five years.
Union Home Minister Amit Shah, in a post on the social media platform X, stated that these organisations were found to be inciting people to disrupt law and order, posing a threat to “the unity and integrity of Bharat.” He further asserted that anyone involved in activities against national peace, order, and sovereignty would face decisive action from the Modi government. The ban came in a broader context that requires unpacking, as confusion reigns over the polity.
Past events
The Jammu and Kashmir Awami Action Committee (AAC), a broadly socio-political organisation, with a strong following in downtown Srinagar, was founded in 1964 by Farooq during an agitation over the missing holy relic, the Moi-e-Muqaddas — believed to be a hair of the Prophet Muhammad — housed in the Hazratbal Shrine. The relic went missing in December 1963 but was recovered on January 4, 1964, after a turbulent week that shook the Union government as Gulzari Lal Nanda, as Home Minister at the time, directly managed the crisis. The incident sparked widespread outrage and protests, which also escalated into riots as far away as Dhaka, including attacks on minorities. Writer Amitav Ghosh has reflected on the 1963 Hazratbal crisis in his writings as he recalled how the reported theft of a holy relic from the Hazratbal mosque in Srinagar incited widespread riots in Dhaka.
Mirwaiz Moulvi Umar Farooq
| Photo Credit:
NISSAR AHMAD
The ban comes days after Mirwaiz Umar Farooq urged tourism industry stakeholders to act responsibly, emphasising that commercial gains should not come at the cost of faith and culture. His statement came in response to a fashion show in Gulmarg, which sparked a major controversy in Jammu and Kashmir. The luxury fashion brand Shivan & Narresh, which organised the event, faced widespread outrage for allegedly disrespecting religious sentiments during the holy month of Ramadan. Following the backlash, the brand issued a formal apology for the incident.
Umar Farooq assumed the role of Mirwaiz after the assassination of his father, Mirwaiz Moulvi Mohammad Farooq. He later became one of the founding members of the All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC), a coalition of separatist parties established on March 9, 1993. Like his father, Umar Farooq’s political approach has been characterised by adaptability to the evolving political landscape in Kashmir.
In 2002, during the tenure of Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, the idea of political reconciliation gained traction in Kashmir. Mirwaiz Umar, along with the late Abdul Ghani Lone, openly opposed Syed Ali Shah Geelani, a former Jamaat-e-Islami leader, who was against engagement with New Delhi and India-Pakistan reconciliation. This internal division within the Hurriyat Conference was accompanied by violence. On May 21, 2002, Abdul Ghani Lone was assassinated by militants at a memorial function held in honour of the late Farooq. Lone’s son, Sajjad Lone, is now a legislator in the J&K Assembly and has also served as a minister in the J&K government.
The Central government has also decided to ban the Jammu and Kashmir Ittihadul Muslimeen (JKIM), founded by the late Mohammad Abbas Ansari, a prominent Shia leader and one of the key separatist interlocutors of the BJP-led Central government in the past. A personal recollection is particularly relevant.
On the evening of August 22, 2003, Moulvi Mohammad Abbas Ansari, the then Chairman of the moderate faction of the All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC), gave an interview to The Hindu, stating that the APHC was willing to engage in dialogue with the Central government. In his interview, which was published on the front page on August 23, 2003, he said, “The APHC has made a change in its policy by not stressing the inclusion of Pakistan in the dialogue process.” He further stated, “We are prepared to talk with a fresh approach and with an open mind. Let the Centre come out with a proposal, and we are prepared to talk.”
The interview came at a time when the Vajpayee government was keen to engage with separatist organisations, as Pakistani President Musharraf had said that Pakistan was willing to settle in accordance with the wishes of the people of J&K, even if it went against Pakistan’s longstanding stance that J&K should become part of its territory. Immediately after the publication of the interview, a senior official from the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) tracked this writer down to verify credentials and the details mentioned in the interview. The rest is history. Deputy Prime Minister L.K. Advani invited the APHC, led by Maulana Abbas Ansari, for talks on January 22, 2004, in which Mirwaiz was also present.
The above recollection highlights the dangers of viewing the separatist camp through a binary lens in a complex and volatile region like J&K. A leader’s autonomy, messaging, and agency, particularly in a conflict setting, are shaped by public sentiment. In Kashmir’s conflict landscape, a separatist leader’s current public statements must be understood in context and may not be the sole factor in policy formulation, especially when institutional memory remains crucial. The fact is that in times of crisis, particularly during large-scale protests, the Central leadership has often used its good offices to reach out to separatist leaders, including hardliner Syed Ali Shah Geelani, and ask them to appeal for peace.
However, what makes the recent bans even more significant is that they come amid ongoing political uncertainty and confusion in J&K, particularly regarding the coexistence of two parallel structures — the Chief Minister and the Lieutenant Governor (L-G). Over the past five months, even though Chief Minister Omar Abdullah has been careful in his public messaging, avoiding direct criticism of the Central leadership, there are no signs of the restoration of statehood to J&K.
In the face of absence of able support that can amplify the National Conference’s world view nationally and its institutional impediments, Chief Minister Omar Abdullah has tried to fill this voice on his own. In New Delhi, he has single-handedly highlighted his difficulties, particularly the lack of statehood for J&K.
On any law and order issue, Chief Minister Omar Abdullah and his team is quick to emphasise that matters related to law and order fall under the L-G’s jurisdiction and are not currently his administration’s responsibility. There also seems to be a realisation that the ability of the State government agency to control the law and order situation in the past was limited. The turbulence witnessed in the Valley during the summer of 2010 is an example of this.
In 2010, the Omar Abdullah-led National Conference (NC) government faced severe criticism for its inability to control the situation. Unlike earlier uprisings, social media played a crucial role in mobilising protesters in 2010. Youth used Facebook and SMS services to organise demonstrations and coordinate strategies. There was a criticism that the Abdullah government did not have agency and control over the situation on the ground. Above all, his government was criticised for his failure to politically engage with the situation.
Faced with a limited mandate of governing the Union Territory of J&K, Chief Minister Omar Abdullah has presented the budget and announced some popular decisions such as free public transport for women. But the feedback loop between governance and law enforcement appears disrupted, further exacerbating the crisis and it is showing the effects on the ground even on routine law and order matters. Amidst the ongoing political uncertainty and parallel governance structures, public confusion has deepened. Crime rates appear to be rising, and citizens are uncertain about whom to approach for help. Complaints to the political structure are of no help.
Lower-ranking police officials frequently complain about manpower shortages, which are reflected in the increased crime rates. Normal beat policing seems to have suffered. The results are obvious. Unidentified thieves have repeatedly targeted temples even in the otherwise peaceful Jammu, the winter capital, stealing money from donation boxes and, in one disturbing incident, reportedly ransacking urns containing the ashes of the deceased at the cremation ground. Violent crime has also escalated — a gangster was killed in broad daylight, and a gold showroom was robbed in a bold daytime heist, where armed robbers took the store owner hostage before escaping with 1.5 kilograms of gold.
Dual power structure
These incidents, as mentioned earlier, are unfolding in the larger context of a dual power structure, where administrative decision-making lacks coherence due to unclear jurisdictional authority. Interestingly, both Opposition parties — BJP and PDP — along with the ruling NC are reinforcing the narrative that the electoral mandate is not being respected as they point out administrative machinery ignores the elected legislators. However, their public narrative differs: the BJP, despite its stance, is careful not to directly criticise the Central government for delaying the restoration of statehood to Jammu & Kashmir, as it would mean criticising its own party in power at the Centre.
Complex challenge
The stakes are high, demanding a broader perspective on conflict management and peacebuilding. Unlike any other State or administrative unit, J&K’s nearly 80-year-old history of turbulence in South Asia makes governance a complex challenge. While the Central government can act as a facilitator in the restoration of public faith in democratic institutions, the primary responsibility rests with the local ruling elite, whose role extends beyond administration. This includes ensuring local ownership of the political structure, representing and empowering the population, addressing political aspirations, healing past wounds, and fostering national awareness of J&K’s unique socio-political realities to create a more informed discourse.
Political entities, especially elected leaders, are vital in voicing the aspirations of the local population and bridging the gap between the people and governing institutions. In J&K, where historical grievances and political sensitivities run deep, their role goes beyond governance — they must translate public sentiment into meaningful dialogue and policy action. By advocating for local concerns, addressing socio-political disparities, and ensuring representation in decision-making, they foster trust and stability. Without their active engagement, governance risks becoming detached from ground realities, further alienating the people and deepening existing divides.
The region’s present political landscape, clouded by confusion and indecision, raises urgent questions about the path forward. The people of J&K remain in limbo, awaiting clarity. Whether through restoration of statehood, broader respect for constitutional rights within the ambit of federalism or renewed dialogue, a clear and inclusive political framework is essential. The coming months will be pivotal in shaping the region’s future. Institutional memory and long-standing governance practices — built through immense national sacrifice in J&K— must be leveraged to restore faith in democratic institutions and pave the way for lasting peace.
Finally, the recent ban on the Awami Action Committee (AAC) adds yet another layer of complexity to Jammu and Kashmir’s already turbulent political landscape. Chief Minister Omar Abdullah’s reservations about the decision, particularly his assertion that his administration was not consulted or provided with intelligence justifying the move, highlight the deeper governance challenges in the region. His stance reflects a broader concern about the lack of coordination between the Central and State governments on critical security and political matters, reinforcing the perception of a power imbalance under the current dual administrative structure. At a time when J&K is grappling with an undefined road map for statehood, and persistent governance challenges, absence of a coherent strategy for engagement with local stakeholders, coupled with the exclusion of elected representatives from key decisions, could exacerbate existing tensions rather than fostering stability.
Moving forward, the Central and State governments must prioritise restoration of public trust by ensuring transparency, institutional coordination and political inclusivity. While security considerations remain important, a governance framework that integrates political dialogue, local agency and democratic processes will be essential for lasting peace and stability in the region. The coming months will be crucial in determining whether Jammu and Kashmir moves toward reconciliation and stability or continues to navigate the challenges of uncertainty and discontent.
(Luv Puri has authored two books on J&K, including Uncovered face of militancy and Across the Line of Control)
Published – March 18, 2025 11:57 am IST