Myanmar at crossroads: crisis, aid and fight for stability

At dawn on November 28, 1885, King Thibaw and Queen Supayalat were escorted out of Mandalay Palace by British troops, marking the fall of the Konbaung Dynasty and Burma’s (now Myanmar) annexation into British India. As portrayed in the novel The Glass Palace, their exile to India symbolised the collapse of a once-powerful empire.

Mandalay — with an estimated population of approximately 1.6 million, the country’s second-most populated city after Yangon — is again at the centre of a tragedy, devastated by a shallow 7.7-magnitude earthquake that has claimed at least 2,000 lives and left countless others homeless.

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The destruction of buildings and infrastructure comes at a time when Myanmar is already battling internal conflict. The country is fragmented, with over 40 percent of its territory outside the military’s control, and fierce fighting raging in peripheral regions since 2021 military coup. Most of the causalities are in and around Mandalay, which remains under the control of military junta in the ethnic Burman heartland. Ethnic Burmans are the majority in Mandalay and it hosts the largest Chinese-origin community in Myanmar.

Reshaping landscape

Earthquakes have often reshaped a nation’s political and social landscape. A key example is Turkey’s 1999 earthquake, which killed over 17,000 people and exposed severe mismanagement in disaster response. Public anger over the government’s inefficiency played a significant role in the rise of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who later won the 2002 elections on promises of better governance and reform.

However, Turkey’s 2023 earthquake reignited similar dissatisfaction, with criticism over building regulations and relief efforts influencing political debates ahead of national elections. Yet, crises can also foster resilience, with grassroots organisations stepping in where governments falter. While reporting for this paper, I spent nearly a week in a makeshift camp, adjoining a flattened residential complex, in Muzaffarabad, the capital of Pakistan-controlled Kashmir — three months after the October 8, 2005, earthquake that claimed at least 87,000 lives — witnessing the crucial role local civil society organisations play in everyday relief and rehabilitation work. However, power vacuums can also be exploited by harmful actors.

Also read:Who is helping Myanmar after the earthquake?

In the case of Myanmar, understanding the broader societal and political landscape on the ground is crucial for effective relief efforts. Building on past experiences, the international community should formulate concrete recommendations to enhance aid delivery and coordination.

First of all, given that much of the earthquake-affected region remains under the control of the military, the military leadership will inevitably serve as the main interlocutor for any large-scale humanitarian response. This reality complicates efforts by the National Unity Government (NUG), government-in-exile formed in response to Myanmar’s military coup in February 2021, and international actors to deliver aid independently. While the NUG has declared a ceasefire to facilitate relief operations, its limited access to the impacted areas poses significant challenges. As a result, humanitarian agencies may be compelled to engage with the military. The military, in the past, strategically used aid in the past — both to consolidate power and to control populations, especially during or after crises. Similar fears are being voiced.

Second, unlike many other countries affected by earthquake, there is a serious deficit of overt civil society organisations capable of guiding foreign aid. Civil society organisations in Myanmar remain weak due to decades of military rule and the dominance of state agencies, particularly the feared military intelligence. I had the personal experience of being followed by military intelligence during the 2012 by-elections held on 1 April as part of the UN mission sent by the Secretary-General to follow the electoral process.

The Sangha (Buddhist monastic community) in Myanmar is the closest equivalent entity which has some organisational structure that can play humanitarian work. However, the Sangha’s ability to help in Myanmar is often restricted by government control and internal divisions within the monastic community. Despite these obstacles, many monks continue to serve as humanitarian leaders, often working covertly or through trusted community networks. There are other groups, informal community networks, not on the radar of the military, and the international community has to find the means to reach out to them without putting them in harm’s way.

Historical echoes

As Myanmar faces a renewed crisis, the international community can draw on past experiences to guide its response. The country has long been vulnerable to natural disasters, with Cyclone Nargis in 2008 exposing the military junta’s failure to deliver timely relief—resulting in over 138,000 deaths and 1.5 million displaced.

The junta’s refusal to allow immediate international aid intensified both domestic anger and global condemnation. This crisis mirrored earlier repression, including the 2007 Saffron Revolution, where monks led mass protests against economic mismanagement — met with brutal military crackdowns and arrests. Following the Nargis disaster, France proposed invoking the UN’s Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) to justify delivering aid, while the junta blocked the French vessel Mistral. First Lady Laura Bush publicly denounced the regime, urging global pressure. Despite initial resistance, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon’s diplomacy, supported by ASEAN, led to a tripartite agreement allowing humanitarian access. While a diplomatic breakthrough was reached, the junta remained distrustful, tightly controlling aid distribution.

Contextual change

At the same time, the context has altered to a large extent. The Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) phase has disappeared after Libya and in the post-2016 US elections era, the liberal international order has taken a hit. The liberal international order, a catalyst for collective action and humanitarian intervention, has been weakened by the surge of nationalist agendas, escalating geopolitical rivalries, and a fraying multilateral framework.

This time, Myanmar’s army chief, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, has made a rare and unexpected appeal for international aid — an unusual move for a regime that has long rejected foreign intervention. As the architect of the 2021 coup, he has overseen brutal crackdowns on pro-democracy movements, plunging the country into deeper political and humanitarian turmoil.

In response, Western nations — including the U.S., EU, UK, and Canada — have imposed sweeping sanctions, freezing assets, enforcing travel bans, and targeting military-controlled businesses to cripple the junta’s financial networks. Yet, despite international pressure, he has preserved close ties with Russia and China, securing military backing and diplomatic support to shield his regime from complete isolation. Beyond his repression of dissent, Min Aung Hlaing’s global reputation remains tarnished by his role in the 2017 Rohingya crisis — one of the worst humanitarian disasters in modern history — when his forces carried out a brutal military crackdown in Rakhine State, forcing more than 700,000 Rohingyas to flee into Bangladesh. Against this backdrop, the international community faces a precarious dilemma: how to provide desperately needed humanitarian aid without inadvertently legitimising the very regime responsible for so much suffering — especially when the hardest-hit areas remain under military control.

The EU has announced an initial €2.5 million in emergency aid, while President Trump has pledged U.S. support for Myanmar following the devastating earthquake. However, uncertainty remains over how U.S. aid will be delivered, especially as the crisis unfolds amid the Trump administration’s efforts to scale back and restructure the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) under its ‘America First’ policy — raising further doubts about the scope and effectiveness of American relief efforts.

Policy recommendations

In terms of recommendations and future planning, external actors — primarily Asian countries with leverage — should use established communication channels to urge Myanmar’s military leadership to release and allow at least non-violent opposition actors to mobilise and support relief efforts.

According to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP), the junta has arrested approximately 28,940 individuals since the coup. Meanwhile, the military’s recent call for opposition participation in upcoming elections has been met with widespread scepticism, given ongoing conflict and deep-seated mistrust. The military’s capacity has been significantly weakened by civil war, limiting its ability to effectively manage relief and rehabilitation efforts— including urgent trauma care, controlling disease outbreaks, and restoring health services —unlike other authoritarian regimes.

Without giving the military leadership the legitimacy that it is eagerly seeking, a discreet engagement with appropriate sections of the military may be a potentially prudent strategy to address the pressing humanitarian needs. There is a need to broaden the scope of engagement as the military is not a monolithic entity. From 2010 to 2015, the former military general and president, Thein Sein, had reached out to the National League for Democracy leadership and other groups and made them a part of the electoral fold. President Sein and his team had supported efforts to promote democracy, national reconciliation, and a market-oriented economy by incorporating best practices. In this connection, different interlocutors of the military should be immediately urged to reciprocate NUG’s declaration of a temporary ceasefire in quake-affected areas, enabling safe relief access and signalling basic concern for civilian welfare.

This challenge mirrors the obstacles foreign aid workers faced in 2008, when strict government controls and restricted humanitarian access severely hindered relief efforts. Navigating these constraints and diversifying the aid delivery channels is crucial to preventing further suffering while upholding humanitarian norms and principles. Given Myanmar’s volatile landscape, the international community must anticipate various scenarios. Public frustration may escalate if aid is delayed or manipulated, and the junta — already battling mounting resistance — may struggle to contain both the crisis and public outrage with its dwindling resources. If aid distribution becomes another flashpoint for discontent, Myanmar risks spiralling further into chaos, forcing the international community to reassess its approach —balancing humanitarian imperatives with geopolitical realities.

At a practical level, regional actors play a central role in immediate disaster response efforts, making a broader Asian collective approach essential. ASEAN, the ten-member regional-bloc of South East Asian countries, is expected to play a critical role in Myanmar’s unfolding crisis, just as it did during the 2008 Cyclone Nargis response.

Since the February 2021 coup, the junta has faced growing diplomatic isolation in Southeast Asia. ASEAN’s Five-Point Consensus, intended to broker a resolution, has seen limited progress. As a result, the bloc barred Myanmar’s military leaders from high-level summits. While ASEAN has stopped short of imposing formal sanctions on Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, it has persistently excluded his regime from key meetings, allowing only non-political representatives to participate. The bloc has also urged the junta to prioritise inclusive dialogue over its planned elections and to halt violent crackdowns on civilians. Although less severe than Western sanctions, these measures demonstrate growing regional pressure on Myanmar’s military leadership, signalling that ASEAN will not passively tolerate the junta’s actions.

The ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management (AHA Centre) is already playing a pivotal role in coordinating relief efforts. Established on November 17, 2011, the AHA Centre serves as ASEAN’s central disaster response hub, headquartered in Jakarta. Its creation was a direct response to the failures exposed by Cyclone Nargis in 2008, underscoring the need for a stronger, more coordinated regional relief mechanism.

Operating under the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER), the AHA Centre has since mobilised aid, deployed rapid response teams, and facilitated international assistance during crises across Southeast Asia. Beyond ASEAN countries, China, India and Russia swiftly dispatched rescue teams following the disaster.

India, for instance, launched Operation Brahma, deploying naval ships and airlifting a field hospital to support affected communities. Additional naval vessels and a disaster contingency force are expected to follow, further reinforcing relief efforts. In the post-2021 coup phase, the Indian security establishment, including the military, has maintained limited engagement with Myanmar’s military as part of its broader strategy to ensure peace and stability along the shared border. This highlights the crucial role of neighbouring countries in crisis response, often stepping in where Western powers face political and logistical constraints. To strengthen a collective Asian approach, Japan and South Korea should also be integrated into these efforts. Their involvement would complement existing initiatives by providing essential medical aid, logistical expertise, and contingency support on the ground.

Reviving global solidarity

There is also an urgent need for international mechanisms that unite Asian and Western countries in aiding Myanmar’s affected populations, with the primary priority being to save lives in the new context. A platform comprising both Western and Asian nations — such as the UN Secretary-General’s Group of Friends on Myanmar — once played a key coordinating role but was disbanded after the 2015 election, under the assumption that Myanmar’s democratic transition was irreversible. Reviving and restructuring such a mechanism into a more actionable entity is crucial. Collaborative efforts between regional and global actors can significantly enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of aid delivery, ensuring that humanitarian assistance reaches those in need without political interference.

There is no doubt that the recent earthquake has worsened Myanmar’s already dire challenges. This disaster is not just a test of Myanmar’s ability to recover but a crucial moment for the international community to reaffirm its commitment to humanitarian principles. If approached with wisdom and resolve, this tragedy could become a pivotal moment—restoring not just infrastructure and livelihoods, but also reaffirming the global community’s capacity to act with integrity, strategically, empathy, and purpose at a time when growing calls for protectionism and nationalism threaten to erode collective responsibility.

(The author was a member of the UN Secretary-General’s Good offices on Myanmar)