Why do we have Governors in every State? | Explained

The story so far

The Supreme Court on April 8, 2025 delivered a significant verdict delineating the powers of the President and the Governors, on the issue of grant of assent to Bills passed by State legislatures, under Articles 201 and 200 respectively of the Constitution. The judgement has sparked a debate across the country and therefore, it becomes imperative to look into the history of the institution of Raj Bhavans in every State. Interestingly, the 415-page judgement of the top court itself provides a valuable insight into the past.

When did the office of Governor come into existence?

In their exhaustive verdict, Justices J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan point out that the administration of country transitioned from the East India Company to the British Crown with the enactment of the Government of India (GoI) Act of 1858 which brought about a new administrative framework in which the Governor, as an agent of the Crown, operated under the general supervision of a higher authority titled as Governor General.

Though this structure prevailed for quite a few years, the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms of 1919 aimed at increasing increased Indian participation in governance, led to the enactment of the GoI Act of 1919. Even after the enactment of the new law, the Governor remained central to the provincial administration in the country and continued to wield significant authority. Subsequently, the GoI Act of 1935 ushered in the era of provincial autonomy and formally required the Governor to act on the advice of the Ministers. Yet, the 1935 law too safeguarded the discretionary powers of the Governor such as vetoing a Bill passed by a legislative council.

When the country was nearing Independence, almost every other document including the Commonwealth India Bill of 1925, the Nehru Report of 1928 and the Constitution of Hindustan Free State Act, an aspirational document prepared by the All India Hindu Mahasabha in 1944, advocated for adopting the westminster style of polity and insisted on retaining the office of the Governor.

What were the changes made to the office of Governor?

Justice Pardiwala points out that the declaration of Independence brought about a fundamental transformation in the role of the Governor. Until the Constitution came into effect in 1950, the provisions of the GoI Act of 1935 as modified by the India (Provisional Constitution) Order of 1947 governed the administration of the country. Significantly, the 1947 Order omitted the expressions ‘in his discretion,’ ‘acting in his discretion,’ and ‘exercising his individual judgment’ from the Act, signaling a departure from the colonial framework.

One of the key decisions that the framers of the Constitution had to take was to decide whether the Governor should be elected by way of a direct election or selected from a panel of names suggested by the State legislature or nominated by the President. While in the early days, the Constituent Assembly leaned towards having an elected Governor; as the framing of the Constitution neared its conclusion, there was increasing support in favour of having a Governor nominated by the President.

Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru attributed this shift of opinion to the bitter experience of partition, which, according to him, opened the eyes of the Constituent Assembly to the dangers of separatism and the need for having a political structure which focused more on the character of the nation as a Union of States rather than a federation.

How did the Constitutent Assembly deal with the office of Governor?

Constitutent Assembly memeber H.V. Kamath argued that an elected Governor, being a partisan figure, would inevitably clash with the Chief Minister, thereby disrupting the functioning of a cabinet style government. According to him, the role of a constitutional head should be impartial and symbolic, and therefore, the nomination system was better suited to uphold these principles.

Hukam Singh treaded a middle path by acknowledging the difficulties inherent in both pure election and pure nomination for the purpose of appointment of Governors. Recognising the high costs involved in conducting elections, he proposed a balanced alternative, suggesting that a panel of candidates be nominated by the State legislature and a Governor be chosen from the said panel.

Rohini Kumar Chaudhari was prophetical in his argument before the Constituent Assembly. He opposed the nomination of Governors by cautioning that a Governor appointed by the Centre and belonging to a different political party than the provincial government, could lead to discord between him and the provincial governments and thereby undermine provincial autonomy.

While many other members too expressed their opinions, Nehru felt that an elected Governor could exacerbate provincial divisions and weaken ties with the Centre. “I feel that if we have an elected Governor that would to some extent encourage separatist provincial tendency more than otherwise. There will be far fewer common links with the Centre,” he told the Constitutent Assembly which finally agreed upon appointment of Governor through Presidential nomination.

Does the Governor enjoy discretionary powers?

Article 163 of the Constitution states that the Governor shall exercise his functions on the aid and advise of a council of ministers headed by the Chief Minister “except in so far as he is by or under this Constitution required to exercise his functions or any of them in his discretion.”

When the Constituent Assembly debated the necessity for providing such discretion to the Governor, B.R. Ambedkar said, the discretion was of limited nature and could be exercised only within the parameters of the constitutional provisions. He pointed out that the words intended to be included in Article 163 (then numbered as draft Article 143) were ‘except in so far as he is by or under this Constitution’ and not ‘except wherever he thinks that he should exercise this power of discretion against the wishes or against the advice of the ministers.’

When the discussion turned towards Article 200 (then numbered as draft Article 175), which mandates Governor’s assent to a Bill passed by the legislature for it to become an Act, Ambedkar himself moved an amendment on July 30, 1949 to remove the expression ‘in his discretion’ from the Article. He felt that “in a responsible government, there can be no room for the Governor acting on discretion.” The amendment was successfully carried out after a debate and the expression was removed.

What has the Supreme Court held now?

It is by relying upon the Constituent Assembly debates to understand the intent behind the framing of Article 200, the Bench comprising Justices Pardiwala and Mahadevan have now held that the Governors do not enjoy either the power to veto (witholding assent to a Bill indefinitely without assigning reasons) or pocket veto (keeping a Bill pending without taking any decision for an indefinite period) a legislation passed by an elected legislature. Since neither Article 200 nor 201 lays down timeline for grant of assent, the court has prescribed timelines for the President as well as the Governor when it comes to granting assent to Bills.

The judges took note that the first Administrative Reforms Commission established by the Union Home Ministry in 1966 as well as the Rajamannar Commission set up by the Tamil Nadu government in 1969 had recommended framing of guidelines on the discretionary powers of the Governor. Similarly, the Sarkaria Commission established in 1983 and the Punchi Commission constituted in 2007 had recommended adoption of definite timelines for processing State Bills.

What is difference between prescribing and reading in timelines?

Taking a cue from those recommendations as well as a February 4, 2016 office memorandum of the Union Home Ministry which insists on clearing State legislations sent for President’s assent within three months, the judges ordered that the President must take a decision on grant of assent within three months. Similarly, they prescribed a time line of one to three months for the Governors to either grant assent, withold assent or refer the Bill to the President.

The judges made it clear that they were only prescribing the timelines and not reading them into Article 200 since the latter course would amount to amending the Constitution. Explaining the need for prescribing the timelines, the judges said, failure to adhere to these timelines would enable the State government concerned to approach the court for an appropriate remedy and also provide an opportunity for the office of the Governor to explain the delay thereby enabling the court to take a decision on a case-by-case basis.

“Any deliberate inaction on part of the Governor in assenting to Bills or reserving them for the consideration of the President, thus, has to be viewed as a serious threat to the federal polity of the country and the aggrieved governments cannot be left remediless, desperately waiting for a decision at the hands of the Governor,” the Bench said thereby bringing in a new dimension to the functioning of the age-old office of the Governor.